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Comment
THE “TIE” GOES TO THE STATE IN KANSAS V.
MARSH: A SMALL VICTORY FOR
PROPONENTS OF THE DEATH PENALTY∗1
I. INTRODUCTION
The issue at the heart of capital punishment jurisprudence is
whether imposing the death penalty violates the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment.2 Over
the last twenty-five years, the United States Supreme Court has
approved the use of the death penalty as an acceptable means of
punishing criminals for certain violent crimes, but it has set forth
requirements which a state’s sentencing statute must meet to pass
constitutional muster.3 For example, the statute must rationally reduce
∗

Winner of the 2007 Valparaiso University Law Review Case Comment Competition.
See State v. Marsh, 102 P.3d 445, 457-58 (Kan. 2004) (finding that the weighing
equation in Kansas’s death sentencing statute was unconstitutional because when the
balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances weigh equally, according to the
statute, the “tie” goes to the State and the death penalty must be imposed; and conversely,
holding that “fundamental fairness requires that a ‘tie goes to the defendant’ when life or
death is at issue.”), rev’d, 126 S. Ct. 2516 (2006).
2
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law[]”); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.”). Public opinion in the United States concerning support for the death penalty
has fluctuated over time. Joshua Marquis, The Myth of Innocence, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 501, 501 (2005). For example, it fell in the 1960s, rose with the increase of
violent crime in the 1980s, and fell again in 2000. Marquis, supra, at 501, 503. Significantly,
though, there has been a long history of Americans accepting the death penalty as
punishment for the crime of murder. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176 (1976).
Furthermore, over the last quarter of a century, public support for the death penalty has
been strong, ranging from sixty-five to eighty-five percent, indicating that a majority of
people have long-favored it. Marquis, supra, at 519.
3
See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (holding that because
our criminal justice system is unavoidably susceptible to error, imposing the uniquely
irreversible punishment by death requires utmost scrutiny to ensure that it is not cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (finding
that “discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly
arbitrary and capricious action.”); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (noting that the death penalty is different in nature than any other punishment
in our criminal justice system and that because of the finality of a death sentence, there
exists an extraordinary need for reliability in the conclusion that death is the appropriate
punishment in a specific case); Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the
Innocent: A Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121, 121, 146 (1988)
(acknowledging, though actually advocating for capital punishment, that using the death
penalty “entails some risk that an innocent person will be executed.”).
1
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the class of death-eligible defendants and allow for an individualized
sentencing determination based on the defendant’s personal features,
criminal record, and the circumstances of the crime.4 The Court’s
precedent further establishes that a state enjoys discretion in imposing
the death penalty in a reasonable manner and in deciding how to weigh
aggravating and mitigating factors surrounding the crime.5 Arguably,
though, the Court’s decisions preceding Kansas v. Marsh concerning the
weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not address
all possible questions regarding permissible statutory language.6 Thus,
the Court granted certiorari in Marsh to determine whether Kansas’s
capital sentencing statute, which mandates that the death penalty be
imposed when aggravating and mitigating factors are in “equipoise,”
violates constitutional bans against cruel and unusual punishment.7

See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189 (holding that when determining sentences, “justice generally
requires” that the character and propensities of the offender and the circumstances of the
offense be considered); Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting that capital
sentencing processes must take particularized mitigating factors into account to avoid
“freakishly” imposing death sentences). See generally Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (per curiam)
(holding that the death penalty must not automatically be imposed upon all death-eligible
defendants who commit a specific crime).
5
Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 179 (1988) (plurality opinion) (citing Zant v.
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 875-76 (1983)).
6
See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 651-52 (1990) (upholding the
constitutionality of a statute that mandates imposing the death penalty when one or more
aggravating circumstances are present and mitigating circumstances do not outweigh
aggravating circumstances); Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 374 (1990) (upholding the
constitutionality of a statute that mandates imposing the death penalty when aggravating
circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances); Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299,
307 (1990) (upholding the constitutionality of a statute that mandates imposing the death
penalty when aggravating circumstances exist and no mitigating circumstances are
present). But see State v. Marsh, 102 P.3d at 457-58 (evaluating the constitutionality of
Kansas’s sentencing statute, which mandates imposing the death sentence when mitigating
circumstances do not outweigh aggravating circumstances – seemingly the same statutory
language that the Supreme Court reviewed in Walton fourteen years earlier – and ruling
that the statute violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). The Kansas Supreme
Court noted that “a majority of the United States Supreme Court has never squarely
addressed or decided the facial constitutionality of the equipoise provision before us” and
explained that “[t]his remains true, no matter how . . . courts have interpreted the ruling in
Walton. The Arizona statute at issue in that case was worded differently; and, . . . Justice
White’s plurality decision neither used the word ‘equipoise’ nor specifically referred to
situations in which aggravators and mitigators are in balance.”). Id. at 459.
7
Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, *2521 (2006). The Court employs the term
“equipoise” to refer to a jury’s conclusion that the balance of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances weigh equally. Id. at *2523.
4
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In Marsh, the Court held that Kansas’s statute was constitutional.8
This Comment first introduces the significant facts present in Marsh.9
Second, this Comment discusses the legal background of capital
sentencing jurisprudence, emphasizing the Court’s previous decisions
involving the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors.10 Finally,
this Comment presents the Court’s holding in Marsh, arguing the
appropriateness of the majority opinion and discussing the ruling’s
significance in view of future death penalty cases.11
II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS IN KANSAS V. MARSH
One evening in June of 1996 when Marry Pusch (“Pusch”) returned
to her home with her nineteen-month-old daughter, M. P., Michael
Marsh (“Marsh”) shot Pusch in the head multiple times, stabbed her in
the heart repeatedly, and slashed her throat.12 Then, Marsh applied
accelerant to Pusch’s body and set fire to her house.13 He fled the scene,
abandoning M. P., and the fire ultimately killed M. P.14 The jury at the
district level convicted Marsh of the capital murder of M. P. and found
that three aggravating circumstances existed, which were not
outweighed by any mitigating circumstances.15 Therefore, the jury
sentenced Marsh to death.16

Id. at *2520. The Court also addressed two other issues in Marsh: whether it had
jurisdiction to review the Kansas Supreme Court’s decision and whether adequate state
grounds existed to support the Kansas Supreme Court’s judgment. Id. at *2521-22. It
answered the first question in the affirmative and the second in the negative; thus, the
Court had jurisdiction to hear the case, and the constitutional issue was properly before the
Court. Id.
9
See infra Part II.
10
See infra Part III.
11
See infra Part IV.
12
State v. Marsh, 102 P.3d 445, 452-53 (Kan. 2004), rev’d, 126 S. Ct. 2516 (2006). When
detectives interviewed him, Marsh admitted that he had broken into Pusch’s house ahead
of time and that he had shot her; however, he indicated that his reason for being at the
house was merely because he needed money for a trip to Alaska. Id. He told police that he
had planned to surprise Pusch when she returned home, tie up Pusch and her infant, and
hold them as hostages in exchange for ransom money from Pusch’s husband. Id. He
alleged that his plan went “awry” because Pusch entered the house earlier than he had
expected, causing him to panic and shoot her. Id. at 453.
13
Id. at 452-54.
14
Id. The fire caused severe burns to more than seventy-five percent of M. P.’s body
and, while Marsh tried to argue that M. P.’s burns did not proximately cause her death,
two medical experts – the treating physician and the coroner – testified that the burns and
the resulting internal organ failure of M. P. caused her death. Id.
15
Id. at 453. The three aggravating factors were: “(1) Marsh knowingly or purposely
killed or created a great risk of death to more than one person; (2) he committed the crime
in order to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest or prosecution; and (3) he committed the crime
8

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 2 [2008], Art. 7

678

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

On appeal, Marsh argued that Kansas’s capital sentencing statute is
facially unconstitutional because it requires imposition of the death
penalty in situations when aggravating and mitigating circumstances are
in equipoise.17 The Kansas Supreme Court agreed and reversed and
remanded Marsh’s capital murder conviction for a new trial.18 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of
Kansas’s sentencing statute which mandates that the death penalty be
imposed when the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
weigh equally.19
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF KANSAS V. MARSH
Historically, one of the most passionately debated issues concerning
capital punishment is whether imposing the death penalty is a
constitutional means of punishing criminals for certain crimes.20 The
Constitution, though, actually supports the claim that capital
punishment was accepted by the Framers.21 Furthermore, for at least
two centuries, American courts have accepted capital punishment.22
In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court called attention to
the unique nature and finality of the death penalty and held that it must
only be imposed according to carefully drafted procedures that minimize

in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner.” Id. The mitigating evidence consisted
only of character witnesses. Id. at 465. The jury also convicted Marsh of the first-degree
premeditated murder of Pusch, aggravated burglary, and aggravated arson. Id. at 453, 466.
16
Id. at 453. The jury unanimously agreed to a death sentence for the murder of M. P.
Id. In addition, it sentenced Marsh to life imprisonment for forty years without the
possibility of parole for the murder of Pusch and consecutive sentences totaling eighty-five
months for the arson and burglary convictions. Id.
17
Id. at 458. Marsh contested that the statute’s language prevents a jury from exercising
discretion and expressing a “reasoned and moral response” to mitigating circumstances,
thus violating the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.
18
Id. at 466. The court also reversed and remanded Marsh’s aggravated arson
conviction but affirmed Marsh’s burglary and premeditated murder convictions and
sentences. Id.
19
Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, *2520 (2006).
20
See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 168-87 (1976) (noting that the courts have longdiscussed whether imposing the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
and discussing why capital punishment is not fundamentally unconstitutional); Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 316-28 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring) (reviewing the history of
prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment).
21
See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 177 (indicating that capital punishment was widely accepted
when the Eighth Amendment was ratified).
22
See Furman, 408 U.S. at 333 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“Capital punishment has been
used to penalize various forms of conduct by members of society since the beginnings of
civilization.”).
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the risk of unjustly imposing punishment by death.23 Four years after
Furman, more than thirty-five states had revised their death penalty
statutes in an attempt to meet the goals set forth in Furman.24 In 1976, the
Supreme Court began its present practice of approving capital
sentencing statutes that meet the Furman goals.25
Since 1976, the Supreme Court has continued to evaluate state
sentencing statutes to determine whether they contain the necessary
provisions to comply with the Constitution’s prohibitions against cruel
23
See id. at 313 (White, J., concurring) (discussing capital punishment and explaining
that “there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed
from the many cases in which it is not” and arguing for increased consistency). See
generally Furman, 408 U.S. 238 (per curiam) (finding that imposing the death penalty
according to Georgia’s sentencing statute constituted cruel and unusual punishment
because the statute gave the jury unrestrained discretion to decide whether to impose the
death penalty).
24
See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-80. See Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet,
Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 89 (1987) (stating that
capital sentencing procedures were significantly revised after Furman); Markman & Cassell,
supra note 3, at 121, 146 (indicating that since the aftermath of Furman, many states have
enacted laws that afford capital defendants increased protection against erroneous
imposition of the death penalty); Rob Warden, Illinois Death Penalty Reform: How It
Happened, What It Promises, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 381, 386 (2005) (noting that in
response to Furman, thirty-eight state legislatures have passed new capital sentencing laws
with revised procedures that more appropriately address the problems discussed in
Furman and safeguard against cruel and unusual punishment by bifurcating the trial and
sentencing phases and by providing additional guidance to assist those charged with
determining the sentencing of a death-eligible defendant). The thirty-seven states that
currently have death penalty laws are “Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wyoming.”
Warden, supra, at 386 n.27.
25
See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 168-69 (addressing the question left unresolved by Furman
concerning whether punishment by death for the crime of murder is always “cruel and
unusual[,]” the Court held that “punishment of death does not invariably violate the
Constitution” and upheld Georgia’s revised sentencing statute) (emphasis added); Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268, 276-77 (1976) (upholding Texas’s revised capital sentencing statute
because it (1) required at least one aggravating factor to exist before a death sentence could
be imposed, (2) permitted the sentencing authority to consider mitigating factors relating to
the individual defendant, and (3) provided for prompt judicial review of a death sentence
by a court with statewide jurisdiction). But see, e.g., Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 331
(1976) (striking down Louisiana’s mandatory capital sentencing statute because it fails to
give the jury an opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances surrounding the
commission of the murder); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 296-97, 301 (1976)
(striking down North Carolina’s capital sentencing statute because it automatically applies
the death penalty to everyone convicted of first degree murder and does not permit the
jury to determine the character and records of the individual defendants who are
convicted) (citing Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)).
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and unusual punishment.26 The Supreme Court has heard several cases
involving aggravating and mitigating factors and has acknowledged a
state constitutional right to impose the death penalty; however,
arguably, uncertainty still existed as to whether a state could statutorily
mandate imposing the death penalty where the balance of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances are in equipoise.27 Therefore, in 2006, the
Court granted certiorari in Marsh to evaluate and determine the
constitutionality of Kansas’s sentencing statute, which requires
imposition of the death penalty if aggravating and mitigating
circumstances weigh equally.28
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION IN KANSAS V. MARSH
A. The Kansas v. Marsh Decision
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court upheld Kansas’s capital
sentencing statute and determined that it did not violate the Eighth and

26
See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 555, 560 (2005) (holding that imposing the
death penalty on juvenile persons under the age of eighteen is unconstitutional); Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-20, 321 (2002) (holding that imposing the death penalty on
persons who are mentally retarded is unconstitutional); Melissa A. Waters, Mediating
Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing
International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487, 487 (2005) (noting that Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority in Roper, cited international practices “as evidence of ‘the overwhelming weight of
international opinion against the juvenile death penalty.’”).
27
See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing Walton, Boyde, and Blystone, in
which the Court upheld sentencing statutes involving weighing of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and setting forth the argument in Marsh, in which the petitioner
asserted that the Court had never specifically ruled on the constitutionality of a statute that
mandates the death penalty when the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
is in equipoise); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 179 (1988) (plurality opinion) (“[W]e
have never held that a specific method for balancing mitigating and aggravating factors in
a capital sentencing proceeding is constitutionally required.”) (citing Zant v. Stephens, 462
U.S. 862, 875-76 (1983)). But see McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 304 (1987) (quoting
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)) (Burger, C. J., plurality) (“The sentencer . . .
[cannot] be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers
as a basis for a sentence less than death.”) (emphasis in original); Skipper v. South Carolina,
476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986) (ruling that precluding testimony by the petitioner concerning “his
good behavior” during the time he was in jail pending trial was unconstitutional because
the jury should have been able to consider the testimony as a potentially mitigating factor)
(citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982)) (noting that a sentencing statute
must permit the jury to evaluate mitigating factors).
28
Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, *2521 (2006). Though the challenged statute was
enacted in 1994, no one has actually been executed in Kansas since 1965 (before Furman v.
Georgia). David Klepper, Court Actions Have Mixed Impact in Two States: Death Penalty
Restored in Kansas, KAN. CITY STAR, June 27, 2006, at A1.
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Fourteenth Amendment bans against cruel and unusual punishment.29
The Court first held that its decision in Walton v. Arizona required
approval of Kansas’s statute.30 Second, the Court explained that its
general death penalty jurisprudence further supported the determination
that Kansas’s statute was constitutional.31 Finally, the Court argued that
the dissent’s contention concerning the advent of DNA evidence was
wholly irrelevant to the narrow question before the Court.32 These three
central holdings are examined in turn.
Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas, joined by four members of
the Court, first discussed Walton.33 Walton had argued that Arizona’s
sentencing statute was unconstitutional because it mandated imposition
of the death penalty if mitigating circumstances did not outweigh
aggravating circumstances.34 The Court, however, held that a sentencing
statute could require a defendant to prove that mitigating circumstances
outweigh aggravating circumstances; additionally, it emphasized that a
critical factor is that the sentencing authority must be permitted to
consider any mitigating evidence.35 Justice Thomas concluded that
Walton controlled the issue presented in Marsh and, based on Walton,
Kansas’s statute was constitutional because it did not prevent the
sentencing authority from considering mitigating evidence.36

Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at *2520 (2006).
Id. at *2520. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 651-52 (1990) (holding that Arizona’s
death penalty statute, which placed the burden on the defendant to prove that mitigating
circumstances outweighed aggravating circumstances, was constitutional).
31
Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at *2524. In his concurring opinion, though, Justice Scalia states that
while he agrees that a review of the capital sentencing jurisprudence leads to a
determination that Kansas’s statute is constitutional, he believes that Walton so clearly
controls the issue in Marsh that the jurisprudence discussion is unnecessary. Id. at *2530
(Scalia, J., concurring).
32
Id. at *2528.
33
Id. at *2520. Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito, JJ., joined the majority
opinion, and Scalia, J., wrote a fairly lengthy concurring opinion; Stevens, J., penned a
dissenting opinion, and Souter, J., wrote a dissenting opinion which was joined by Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ. Id. at *2529, 2539.
34
Id. at *2522-24.
35
Id. Marsh claimed that Walton did not specifically address the equipoise issue and, in
fact, Marsh accurately asserted that the actual term “equipoise” did not appear in Walton’s
majority opinion. Id. at *2523. Therefore, Marsh alleged that Walton could not control the
issue concerning the constitutionality of Kansas’s sentencing statute which requires that the
death penalty be applied in the event of equipoise. Id.
36
Id. The Court pointedly noted that the dissenting opinion in Walton unmistakably
established that the equipoise issue was indeed presented to the Court and resolved. Id.
(quoting Walton, 497 U.S. 639, 687-88 (1990)) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“If the mitigating
and aggravating circumstances are in equipoise, the [Arizona] statute requires that the trial
judge impose capital punishment.”). Id.
29
30

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 2 [2008], Art. 7

682

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

To further support the holding that Kansas’s sentencing statute is
constitutional, Justice Thomas next reviewed the Court’s general death
penalty jurisprudence, discussing numerous cases decided over a thirty
year span beginning with Furman.37 The Court determined that Kansas’s
statute was constitutional because it rationally reduced the class of
death-eligible defendants and permitted a sentencing authority to
perform an individualized sentencing determination and to consider
mitigating circumstances.38
Finally, Justice Thomas criticized the dissent’s assertion that the
developments in the field of DNA testing somehow affected the issue as
to the constitutionality of Kansas’s death sentencing statute.39 Justice

37
Id. at *2524-28 (citing Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 179 (1988) (plurality opinion)
(in turn citing Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 875-76 (1983))) (indicating that as long as a
death sentencing statute logically narrows the class of death-eligible defendants and allows
a sentencing authority to perform an individualized sentencing determination, a state may
exercise discretion in imposing the death penalty in a reasonable manner and in deciding
how to weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the crime); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion of Burger, C. J.) (holding that a sentencing statute
must allow the jury an opportunity to consider mitigating evidence). See supra note 4 and
accompanying text (discussing the requirements for individualized sentencing noted in
Gregg and Furman).
38
Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at *2525-26 (finding that “Kansas’[s] procedure narrows the universe
of death-eligible defendants” and indicating that “[u]nder Kansas law, imposition of the
death penalty is an option only after a defendant is convicted of capital murder . . . .”) .
“The system in Kansas provides the type of ‘guided discretion’ we have sanctioned in
Walton, Boyde, and Blystone.” Id. at *2526 (internal citation omitted). For example, in Boyde,
Boyde contested the sentencing statute at issue, arguing that because it mandated imposing
the death penalty in the event aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating
circumstances, it precluded individualized sentencing. Id. at *2526-27. Nonetheless, the
Boyde Court held that the mandatory provision of the statute did not prevent the
sentencing authority from considering any mitigating circumstances, thus making the
statute constitutional. Id. at *2526-27 (citing Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 374 (1990)).
39
See id. at *2528-29. The dissenting opinion states, “Today, a new body of fact must be
accounted for in deciding what . . . the Eighth Amendment . . . should tolerate, for the
period starting in 1989 has seen repeated exonerations of convicts under death sentences, in
numbers never imagined before the development of DNA tests.” Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at *2544
(Souter, J., dissenting). But see id. at *2533 (Scalia, J., concurring) (indicating that Souter’s
dissent irresponsibly and incorrectly characterizes as significant the impact that DNA
testing has had with regard to the exoneration of death-eligible defendants). Scalia notes
that the dissent cannot point to “a single verifiable case” in which a defendant was
erroneously executed and discusses numerous problems with the studies that the dissent
cites, criticizing the dissent for accepting “anybody’s say-so.” Id. at *2529-39 (citing
Markman & Cassell, supra note 3, at 121, 131) (reviewing numerous problems in several of
the cases that are cited in the study that is relied upon by the dissent). Scalia expresses
disappointment that the dissent cites such questionable studies and that, as a result, those
baseless studies will appear in the United States Reports. Id. at *2529-39. See also Markman
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Thomas indicated that the dissenting view was irrelevant because it
exceeded the scope of the issue presented.40 In other words, in
determining the constitutionality of Kansas’s death sentencing statute,
the majority felt it was not necessary to argue in favor of or in opposition
to the death penalty.41
B. Appraisal of the Kansas v. Marsh Decision
The Court in Marsh reached the correct result.42 Kansas’s death
penalty statute does not raise a presumption in favor of death because it
(1) does not prevent the jury from considering any mitigating factors, (2)
sets forth that the imposition of the death penalty is merely an “option”
after a defendant is convicted beyond a reasonable doubt of a capital
offense, and (3) requires that at least one aggravating factor be present in
order for the mandatory death penalty to be imposed.43 Therefore,
& Cassell, supra note 3, at 150 (“There is, in short, no persuasive evidence that any innocent
person has been put to death in more than twenty-five years.”).
40
Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at *2528 (majority opinion). Additionally, Justice Scalia’s concurrence
sharply criticizes Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion. Id. at *2531-39 (Scalia, J., concurring).
He starts with, “[a]s a general rule, I do not think it appropriate for judges to heap either
praise or censure upon a legislative measure that comes before them, . . . .” and continues,
“[t]he dissenters’ proclamation of their policy agenda in the present case is especially
striking because it is nailed to the door of the wrong church-that is, set forth in a case
litigating a rule that has nothing to do with the evaluation of guilt or innocence.” Id. at
*2532. He leads up to a strong finish by noting that “American people have determined
that the good to be derived from capital punishment-in deterrence, and perhaps most of all
in the meting out of condign justice for horrible crimes-outweighs the risk of error.” Id. at
*2539. He wraps up with “[i]t is no proper part of the business of this Court, or of its
Justices, to second-guess that judgment, much less to impugn it before the world, and less
still to frustrate it by imposing judicially invented obstacles to its execution.” Id.
41
Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at *2528-29 (majority opinion). While it was not at issue in this case,
the validity of the death penalty is still largely debated. See, e.g., Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at *254146 (Souter, J., dissenting) (rejecting the death penalty generally); Hugo Adam Bedau &
Michael L. Radelet, The Myth of Infallibility: A Reply to Markman and Cassell, 41 STAN. L. REV.
161 (1988) (arguing in support of their 1987 study, which discussed problems with
imposing the death penalty and was heavily criticized by Markman & Cassell, supra note 3,
at 121); Bedau & Radelet, supra note 24, at 90 (arguing that imposing the death penalty is an
inappropriate way of punishing even those persons who are convicted of the crime of
murder).
42
Based on Walton v. Arizona, the Court properly decided Marsh. See supra note 36, at
*2522-24 (reviewing that Walton squarely dealt with a statute that required the imposition
of the death penalty when aggravating and mitigating circumstances are in equipoise, and
thus, in line with stare decisis, its ruling controls Marsh); Boyde, 494 U.S. at 374 (1990)
(noting that statutory language requiring mandatory imposition of the death penalty in the
event of equipoise did not preclude the sentencing authority from considering mitigating
circumstances; thus, the statute was constitutional).
43
See Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at *2526-27 (citing Boyde, 494 U.S. 370, 377 (1990); Blystone v.
Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 305 (1990) (emphasis omitted)). The Court’s decisions in Boyde
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Kansas’s sentencing system does not remove the jury’s discretion, but
merely supports the jury’s “guided discretion[.]”44 The Constitution
requires that a sentencing authority have discretion when determining
whether capital punishment is appropriate in a particular case, but it
does not require that such discretion be unfettered.45 Thus, the Court’s
ruling in Marsh was appropriate and squarely supported by death
penalty jurisprudence.
C. Anticipated Consequences of the Kansas v. Marsh Decision
The makeup of the Court played a significant role in Marsh.46 Over
the years, the Court had been evenly split on death penalty issues and,
preceding Marsh, uncertainty grew as to whether Justice O’Connor
would support capital punishment.47 Because Justice Alito replaced

and Blystone did not turn on the predominance of aggravating over mitigating
circumstances but, instead, the key factor was that the jury was able to consider any
relevant mitigating factors. Id. at *2526-27. Similarly, a key factor in deciding Marsh was
that the statute allowed the jury to consider mitigating circumstances. But see id. at *254244 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that a law with a mandatory provision “requir[ing]
execution when the case for aggravation has failed to convince the sentencing jury is
morally absurd[]” and produces the “wanton and freakish results[]” that Furman v. Georgia
and its progeny have declared unconstitutional). In contrast, Justice Thomas points out
that while the statute’s mandatory provision could appear to create a presumption of death
if read in isolation, the provision should be evaluated within the context of the full capital
sentencing statute as well as Kansas’s entire capital punishment system. Id. at *2527 n.6
(majority opinion) (noting that a capital sentencing statute must be reviewed within the
context of the capital punishment system).
44
See id. at *2526. Contra Marsh, 126 S. Ct. at *2540 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“If it were
true that this instruction may make the difference between life and death in a case in which
the scales are otherwise evenly balanced, that is a reason why the instruction should not be
given-not a reason for giving it.”). In his dissenting opinion in Marsh, Justice Stevens
further argues that in a situation in which the aggravating and mitigating factors weigh
equally (i.e. equipoise), a situation which he classifies as one in which the jury has “doubt”
as to whether the death penalty is appropriate, it is “fundamentally wrong” for a jury to
choose the death penalty. Id.
45
See id. at *2523 (majority opinion) (citing Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 652 (1990))
(indicating that states retain authority to determine the manner in which a sentencing
authority will consider mitigating circumstances).
46
See Stephen Henderson, Ruling in Kan. May Show Shift by Court on Death Penalty,
PHILA. INQUIRER, June 27, 2006, at A06 (suggesting that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito provided the “pivotal votes” in Marsh, and Justice Alito’s vote was “decisive”);
Klepper, supra note 28, at A1 (indicating that in response to a question asked by the media,
Marsh’s public defender said that the holding “very much depended on the makeup of the
court.”).
47
See Henderson, supra note 46, at A06 (suggesting that Justice O’Connor’s “doubts
about capital punishment had grown in recent years.”).
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Justice O’Connor, his vote in Marsh was critical to the 5-4 outcome.48 The
ruling, indicating that the Court is likely to demonstrate support for the
death penalty in future cases, is disappointing for death penalty
abolitionists.49 Nonetheless, opponents of capital punishment note the
narrowness of the Court’s holding and assert that it will not significantly
impact future death penalty jurisprudence.50
V. CONCLUSION
In this country, where the death penalty has long been favored by a
majority of Americans as a means of punishing violent criminals for
committing murder, Marsh represents a small victory for death penalty
advocates. Its holding may seem trivial on its face, but it is significant
because it marks a shift of increased deference to the states by the United
States Supreme Court concerning the imposition of the death penalty.
Based on Marsh, states will now have an easier time imposing the death
penalty as long as a state rationally reduces the class of death-eligible
defendants and allows for an individualized sentencing determination
based on the circumstances of the crime. Marsh reaffirms that as long as
it acts in a reasonable manner, a state enjoys discretion in imposing the
death penalty and in deciding how the jury should weigh aggravating
and mitigating factors surrounding the crime. Marsh sends a strong
message both to criminals convicted of murder, like Mr. Michael Marsh,
See id. (forecasting that Marsh indicates that the Court’s two “new justices will tip the
balance away from tighter restrictions on capital punishment”); Klepper, supra note 28, at
A1 (mentioning that Justice Alito’s vote was critical and indicating that the public defender
who represented Marsh said that Justice Alito definitely “broke the tie.”).
49
See Henderson, supra note 46, at A06 (suggesting that Marsh’s ruling is a “blow” to
those who oppose the death penalty because it suggests how the “new court” may vote on
larger capital punishment questions).
50
See Klepper, supra note 28, at A1 (arguing that Marsh “won’t do much to settle the
thorny question of capital punishment[,]” mentioning that the holding is not likely to have
much affect on substantive death penalty issues because of its narrow and technical scope,
and indicating that the opposite ruling would have had more of an impact on future death
penalty cases). But see Henderson, supra note 46, at A06 (discussing that it is likely that the
ruling will be telltale of how the current Court will “split” on future death penalty issues).
Additionally, death penalty abolitionists hope that someday DNA testing will prove that
capital punishment is evil because of its risk of erroneously executing innocent people.
James Dao, DNA Ties Man Executed in ‘92 to the Murder He Denied, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2006,
at A14. In a recent case in 2006, Governor Warner ordered DNA testing to determine the
guilt or innocence of a former death row prisoner who was executed in 1992. Id. To the
dismay of those against the death penalty, the DNA testing actually confirmed the
executed prisoner’s guilt. Id. Still, those who oppose the death penalty hope that similar
testing will prove the innocence of future death row inmates. Id. They hope that other
governors will follow Governor Warner’s lead and order similar DNA tests for other
current or former death row inmates. Id.
48
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who shot Ms. Marry Pusch in the head multiple times and then burned
her infant child to death, and to death penalty abolitionists. The current
Court will likely continue to ensure that states have authority to expand
the reach of the death penalty and protect the citizens of this country
from heinous and evil murder.
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